

Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731R002100030026-2  
Speech at Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

12 October 1973 - 0830 - Includes lunch.

"Critical Inputs from the Intelligence Community"

Contact: Miss Brown, autovon: 875-2492/2834

Maxwell provided T-39. 1630 take-off from  
Andrews AFB on 11 Oct 73. Arrive Maxwell  
AFB 1730. Tail # 488, Call Sign TUG-99.


Gen Walters invited by Colonel Lyle, acquaintance  
from Brazil, to attend his seminar party on  
evening of 11 Oct. Col Lyle is student at AWC.  
Dinner/Theater party starts at 1830. Lamplighter  
Theater-in-Round show with Broderick Crawford.  
Cocktails/Dinner/Show. Gen W. accepted.

*Col Lyle : autovon 875-2119*

Gen Walters' brother F.J. Walters picking him  
up at Maxwell to drive him to Atlanta on 12th  
in the afternoon where he will spend weekend.  
Gen Walters returning to Washington Monday  
morning, 15 Oct, departing Atlanta at 0630.

*Cancelled due to  
ME War. Gen-  
Graham went.  
mel*

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27 August 1973

Major General James V. Hartinger  
Commandant  
Air War College (AU)  
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112

Dear General Hartinger:

Thank you for your letter of 10 August 1973 inviting me to address the Air War College Class of 1974 on 12 October. I would be delighted to make the presentation on "Critical Inputs from the Intelligence Community" and to visit some of your seminars.

I will have my office contact Colonel Holcombe to make the final arrangements.

Faithfully,

/s/ Vernon A. Walters

Vernon A. Walters  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

VAW/ncl  
Distribution:  
Orig & 1 - Addressee  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
AIR WAR COLLEGE (AU)  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112



Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear General Walters

I am honored to invite you to address the Air War College Class of 1974 on "Critical Inputs from the Intelligence Community" at 0830, Friday, 12 October 1973.

This presentation is scheduled early in our new academic year. The area of study is "National and World Environment" and the phase of instruction in which the lecture is to be given is "Formulation of National Security Policy." The attached sheets show the scope of your presentation and how it fits into the overall area of study (Attachments 1 and 2). Should you accept, you will receive a complete schedule of instruction for this phase, along with the required student readings, in the near future.

We have scheduled a 45-minute period for your presentation followed by a discussion period. In addition, we would be delighted if you would be able to visit some of our seminars following the question period. These periods will be separated by a short break.

The attached biographical sketch form is forwarded for your convenience (Attachment 3). Should you be able to accept, we would appreciate your including on this form any information you desire, and returning it to us in the attached envelope as soon as conveniently possible.

Colonel Bondy H. Holcombe, of the Air War College faculty, will provide any additional information and assist you in any way possible. He may be contacted at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, area code (205) 293-2130 or 293-2127.

I understand the heavy demands of your schedule during this period; nevertheless, I sincerely hope it will permit your acceptance as your presentation will be one of the highlights of our academic year.

Sincerely

JAMES V. HARTINGER  
Major General, USAF  
Commandant


- 3 Atch  
1. Scope Sheet  
2. Instruction Program  
3. Biographical Sketch Form

*Strength Through Knowledge*

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

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AIR WAR COLLEGE (AWC)  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112



10 AUG 1973

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Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

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*James V. Hartinger*  
JAMES V. HARTINGER  
Major General, USAF  
Commandant

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1. Scope Sheet  
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Strength Through Knowledge

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73-5009/A

*Nancy*

27 August 1973

Major General James V. Hartinger  
Commandant  
Air War College (AU)  
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112

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
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1 - DDCI  
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*Air War College*

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR WAR COLLEGE (AU)

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112



18 SEP 1973

*W*

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear General Walters

As promised earlier, we are sending you the Air War College Bulletin which provides information about our facilities and curriculum. In addition, we have attached a copy of the readings which apply to your period, and which will be completed by the students prior to your lecture.

Also included is a brief outline of the composition of our student body which we felt may be of interest to you.

We are looking forward with great pleasure to your appearance on the Air War College platform. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you would like further information or if we can be of any assistance to you.

Sincerely

*Francis C. Grundy*  
FRANCIS C. GRUNDY

Colonel, USAF  
Chief, Dept. of Governmental  
Affairs

3 Atchs

1. AWC Bulletin
2. Reading Selections
3. Class Composition



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## The Forces that Monitor and Protect

The nation's intelligence system is unquestionably large but it is anything but monolithic. It is a loose aggregation of agencies, each with a specific role and place, wary of any encroachments on its prerogatives. The principal members:

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.** Director-designate: William Colby. Estimated number of employees: 15,000. Estimated budget: \$750 million. Established by the National Security Act of 1947 to replace the World War II Office of Strategic Services. Officially supervised by four congressional committees, but largely autonomous and excused by a 1949 law from any accounting of the funds it gets or spends. In charge of espionage and clandestine operations abroad as well as overt intelligence-gathering activities; forbidden by law to exercise any police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions in the U.S., but has occasionally interpreted these laws freely. Grown somewhat fat over the years, was ordered this year to cut its staff by 10%, but cuts are still not completed.

The director of the CIA also serves ex officio as chairman of the U.S. In-

telligence Board, which reports to President's National Security Council (see diagram). The board coordinates and supervises major American intelligence activities, and exercises supervisory control over every other security system.

**DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.** Director: Vice Admiral Vincent P. dePoix. Number of employees: 5,000. Budget: \$129,300,000. Set up by Robert S. McNamara in August 1961, after the CIA intelligence for Bay of Pigs invasion proved disastrously inadequate, and because the three military services' operations suffered from a lack of overall evaluation. The agency operates under the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Charged with assessing the worldwide military situation, the Defense Intelligence Agency coordinates the conflicting and not infrequently self-serving intelligence operations of the three armed services—Army's G-2, Office of Naval Intelligence and Air Force's A-2. DIA men tend to view CIA men as the spoiled darlings of the intelligence community. The CIA, which once dealt directly with military intelligence services, resents DIA's role as middleman, and tends to look upon

its members as minor-league spies.

**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.** Director: Lieut. General Samuel Phillips, U.S.A.F. Employees: 25,000. Budget: classified. Created in 1952 as a separate agency within the Defense Department. Makes and breaks codes, develops techniques for electronic surveillance of foreign troop and ship movements and construction of military facilities (NSA equipment was used on the U-2 spy plane shot down over Russia in 1960).

**BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH.** Director: Ray S. Cline. Employees: 335. Budget: about \$8,000,000. Intelligence arm of the State Department since 1947. Charged with gathering and analyzing information essential to U.S. foreign policy. Staffed by economists and academicians. Prepares studies on subjects as diverse and esoteric as Albanian public health system and the clove industry in Zanzibar. Generally considered a "clean," as opposed to "dirty" or covert operation.

**ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION.** Director: Dr. Dixy Lee Ray. Total employees: 7,000. Overall budget: \$2,500,000,000. Established in 1946 to govern development of atomic energy. Also maintains a constant watch on the atomic capabilities of other countries, detecting and identifying nuclear tests.

**DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.** Director: George P. Shultz. Total employees: 117,462; 100-200 directly involved in intelligence. Oversees Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Thus responsible for narcotics investigations. Department also includes Secret Service, which protects President and other top officials, maintains liaison with Interpol, the international criminal police organization.

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.** Director: William Ruckelshaus. Employees: 19,857 (including 8,700 agents). Budget: \$336,300,000. Number of field offices: 59. Established in 1908 as investigative arm of the Justice Department, the closest U.S. equivalent to a national police force. FBI has jurisdiction over wide range of crimes from assassination of a President to bank robbery, kidnaping and transportation of stolen cars. Since 1936, has had jurisdiction over espionage and sabotage within the U.S. J. Edgar Hoover, director from 1924 until his death last year, expanded FBI authority to investigate Communists, Ku Klux Klansmen, radical students and other elements he considered a threat to national security. The bureau's latest assignment: getting to the bottom of the so-



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## THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING

*By Chester L. Cooper*

"The most fundamental method of work . . . is to determine our working policies according to the actual conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have made, we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation . . . and were subjective in determining our working policies."—"The Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."

IN bucolic McLean, Virginia, screened by trees and surrounded by a high fence, squats a vast expanse of concrete and glass known familiarly as the "Pickle Factory," and more formally as "Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency." Chiselled into the marble which is the only relieving feature of the building's sterile main entrance are the words, "The Truth Shall Make You Free." The quotation from St. John was personally chosen for the new building by Allen W. Dulles over the objection of several subordinates who felt that the Agency, then still reeling from the Bay of Pigs débâcle, should adopt a somewhat less lofty motto. (In those dark days of late 1961, some suggested that a more appropriate choice would be "Look Before You Leap.") But Dulles had a deeper sense of history than most. Although he was a casualty of the Bay of Pigs and never sat in the Director's office with its view over the Potomac, he left a permanent mark not only on the Agency which he had fashioned but on its building which he had planned.

Allen Dulles was famous among many and notorious among some for his consummate skill as an intelligence operative ("spook" in current parlance), but one of his greatest contributions in nurturing the frail arrangements he helped to create to provide intelligence support to Washington's top-level foreign-policy-makers.

Harry Truman, whose Administration gave birth to both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, recalls that, "Each time the National Security Council is about to consider a certain policy—let us say a policy having to do with Southeast Asia—it immediately calls upon the CIA to present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to have. . . .<sup>1</sup> President Truman painted a somewhat more cozy relationship between the NSC and the CIA than probably existed during, and certainly since, his Administration. None the less, it is fair to say that the intelligence community, and espe-

<sup>1</sup> "Memoirs of Harry S Truman." New York: Doubleday, 1958.



cially the CIA, played an important advisory role in high-level policy deliberations during the 1950s and early 1960s.

To provide the most informed intelligence judgments on the effects a contemplated policy might have on American national security interests, a group especially tailored for the task was organized in 1950 within the CIA. While this step would probably have been taken sooner or later, the communist victory in China, the Korean War and growing East-West tensions stimulated the Truman administration's interest in obtaining carefully prepared intelligence assessments and projections. The Office of National Estimates (ONE) was headed initially by Professor William Langer, eminent diplomatic historian, leading authority on the American duck and master of prose-style. Under his brief stewardship he established guidelines for crisp, objective assessments that have been maintained for two decades.

Since its inception, the Office of National Estimates has maintained its independence within the hierarchy of the CIA, within the intelligence community, and within the national security and foreign policy elements of the government. Each National Intelligence Estimate is written after due consideration of contributions submitted by intelligence analysts both within and outside the Agency, but the final wording bears the unmistakable stamp of ONE's style of composition and analysis.

Estimates, about 50 a year, are written on a variety of subjects relevant to situation or policy considerations affecting the national security interests of the United States—from such elaborate, highly technical examinations as Chinese communist nuclear capabilities as they may develop over the next several years, to more speculative judgments about, say, the probable course of Japanese-Soviet relations in the light of evolving American foreign and economic policy.

The estimates are, by their very nature, a projection into the future: "What will be the effects of . . .?" "What are the probable developments in . . .?" "What are the intentions of . . .?" "What are the future military capabilities of . . .?" When *Pravda* has been scanned, the road-watchers' reports from Laos checked, the economic research completed, Pham van Dong's recent speeches dissected, radar signals examined, satellite observations analyzed, and embassy cables read, the estimators set about their task. What emerges reflects a mass of distilled information, a painstaking search for the *mot just* and an assiduous effort to

## THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING

coördinate the views of all appropriate elements of the intelligence community. And, when all is said and done, what emerges is an opinion, a judgment. But it is likely to be the best-informed and most objective view the decision-maker can get.

The ten men on the National Estimates Board and the twenty or so on the National Estimates Staff (the Board and Staff make up the Office of National Estimates) have virtually unlimited access to classified and unclassified information concerning the political, military and economic situations of foreign countries. Their access to high-level White House, Defense or State policy thinking is much more limited; the fear of leaks which has pervaded the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations has tended to seal off even such élite intelligence groups as the Office of National Estimates from advance knowledge of sensitive "options" under serious consideration by the President. On occasion, now less frequent than in previous years, the Estimates folk are given an inkling of closely held courses of action that may be under high-level review through requests from the White House or the NSC to undertake a "Special" National Intelligence Estimate on "The Consequences of Certain Possible Steps the United States May Take Toward (let us say) Cashmania."

The position of the men and women in the Office of National Estimates, particularly those on the Board, is unique in the government (their closest counterparts were members of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State prior to the recent reorganization of that staff). They are among the most senior civil servants in the government, but unlike their peers elsewhere in the CIA or in other agencies and departments, they have no managerial or administrative responsibilities, they are not obliged to concern themselves with the painful and mundane matter of the annual budgets, they are not asked to appear before congressional committees. Their assigned responsibility is to brood about the world's problems and to project their views about how these problems are likely to affect American national security interests. No one has ever tried to cost out the production of a National Intelligence Estimate. Even if the dollar costs could be determined, who is to weigh the nondollar value of a considered, objective judgment, based on all relevant available information, on a matter important, perhaps vital to American security? At a time when government officials of whatever

stature find themselves so harried that thinking time is at a premium, a group of experts that has an opportunity to ponder is a scarce and precious national asset.

The salad days of CIA's Office of National Estimates were during the Eisenhower administration. It was in this period that the estimators sensed that they had a direct, or at least discernible, participation in the policy process. The National Security Council then played a more important role in the formulation of national security policy than it did under its creator, President Truman, or has under any subsequent administration, including the present one. Anxious to make the NSC a more orderly and effective body, President Eisenhower established a Planning Board charged with "staffing out" policy reviews and recommendations prior to consideration by the Council itself. The Planning Board was chaired by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs and its membership included representatives from the departments and agencies which comprised the NSC. The State Department member, for example, was the chairman of the Policy Planning Staff. The CIA adviser (both the CIA and the Joint Chiefs are nominally, at least, "advisers" rather than "members" of the NSC) was the Deputy Director for Intelligence to whom the Office of National Estimates was then responsible.<sup>2</sup>

The typical Planning Board arrangement involved assigning to the State Department's Policy Planning Staff the task of writing a "position paper" on the issue at hand and to the intelligence community, through the Office of National Estimates, the chore of preparing a National Intelligence Estimate. In due course, a Planning Board draft would be prepared incorporating the essence of these two documents and appropriate contributions from the Bureau of the Budget, the Department of Defense or other member groups.

While this was a far cry from having a firm assurance that the President and his advisers personally read the National Intelligence Estimates, it provided a built-in arrangement for gearing intelligence guidance into the policy-making process. Moreover, Allen Dulles, then Director, included a summary of relevant Estimates in his weekly briefings to the Council. This did not mean that every Estimate was heeded or even taken very seri-

<sup>2</sup> ONE has since been removed from the Intelligence Directorate of the CIA and now operates under the Office of the Director.

## THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING

ously by the policy-makers. But the estimators had some confidence, then, that their views were at least considered prior to a National Security Council position and a presidential decision.

President Kennedy was more interested in dealing with selected individuals than with formal institutions. He abolished the Planning Board together with other subordinate groups that had mushroomed under Eisenhower's NSC and, like President Johnson later, used the Council primarily as a vehicle for communicating decisions already reached in smaller, more congenial forums. There were still high-level, sometimes urgent, requests for Estimates directly addressing pending policy decisions,<sup>8</sup> but ONE's umbilical cord to the policy-making process was severed with the disappearance of the Planning Board. The fact that John Kennedy was a "reading" President was, of course, some compensation. (He is reported to have once called a startled young member of the Estimates Staff about a point in an estimate on Indonesia.)

Aside from momentary diversions into the Caribbean and the Middle East, the Johnson administration's foreign policy concerns were dominated by Vietnam. It is revealing that President Johnson's memoirs,<sup>9</sup> which are replete with references to and long quotations from documents which influenced his thinking and decisions on Vietnam, contain not a single reference to a National Intelligence Estimate or, indeed, to any other intelligence analysis. Except for Secretary McNamara, who became a frequent requestor and an avid reader of Estimates dealing with Soviet military capabilities and with the Vietnam situation, and McGeorge Bundy, the Office of National Estimates had a thin audience during the Johnson administration. This is not to say, of course, that "current intelligence" on crisis situations was ignored. It is to say that Estimates, think pieces and in-depth analyses were far from best sellers.

Early in its tenure the Nixon administration publicly emphasized its determination to restore the National Security Council to its place at the pinnacle of the policy-making pyramid and to establish a more orderly process of policy planning and review. But the system that evolved relegated the National Estimates to but a tiny fraction of the studies, analyses, position

<sup>8</sup> During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, the President's "Executive Committee" requested several estimates.

<sup>9</sup> Lyndon Baines Johnson, "The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963-1969." New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

papers, contingency plans, research reports and memoranda generated by the large new NSC staff murmuring the magic words, "The White House wants immediately. . . ." How much of this deluge of paper has ever been read and assimilated by even those NSC staffers who originally requested the material is a well-kept secret and understandably so. How much ever went beyond their overflowing desks to Mr. Kissinger's busy deputy, to the harassed Mr. Kissinger or to the even more harassed President can only be imagined. A safe bet would be precious little.

Most Americans concerned about foreign affairs have long had to accept on blind faith that our government takes pains to provide its highest officials with the best possible intelligence guidance—and then to squirm under our private suspicions that this advice is, all too often, regarded with indifference. Thanks to Daniel Ellsberg, those of us who have not seen a National Intelligence Estimate for many years, or who have never seen one, can address the matter with somewhat more confidence than we could have a few months ago. Although it probably did not cross Ellsberg's mind when he released the "Pentagon Papers" to *The New York Times*, he succeeded in doing what the Agency, on its own, has rarely been able to do for more than 20 years: he made the CIA "look good" through what inhabitants of the Pickle Factory themselves would call a "highly credible source."

## II

By some stroke of prescience, President Truman singled out Southeast Asia as his example of a problem area where the National Security Council would call for intelligence guidance for policies under consideration. Since Truman wrote his memoirs, this troubled part of the world has given rise to a fair share of NSC deliberation, intelligence analysis and policy decisions. While the "Pentagon Papers" tell us little about what actually happened in the White House Cabinet Room, they do reveal much about the intelligence guidance made available to the policy-makers. The record, recently amplified by President Johnson's memoirs, gives us some insight into the extent to which such guidance was reflected in policy decisions. A review of the record is disquieting.

In the summer of 1954, following the Geneva conference, the Eisenhower administration was desperately attempting to erect

## THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING

a shield against further communist expansion in Asia. Secretary Dulles, especially, was determined to develop a strong anti-communist government south of the 17th parallel in Vietnam and to replace the French economic, military and political influence in that area with our own. The man the United States counted on to establish strong anti-communist rule was Ngo Dinh Diem. By mid-summer, the issue of American support for Diem's fledgling and untried government was high on the NSC's agenda. The CIA was requested to prepare an Estimate on the viability of a Western-supported, anti-communist government in Vietnam. According to the "Pentagon Papers," the National Intelligence Estimate of August 3 warned that "even with American support it was unlikely that the French or Vietnamese would be able to establish a strong government and that the situation would probably continue to deteriorate." The NSC, nevertheless, recommended American aid for the frail and untried Vietnamese government, a recommendation that was soon followed by President Eisenhower's fateful letter to Diem offering American support.

This estimate has long since been validated and it seems clear that the United States would now be better off if President Eisenhower had paid more heed to that warning and less to the strong pressures that were being exerted by his Secretary of State and hard-line members of Congress. But this would probably be asking too much, considering the atmosphere in Washington during the summer of 1954. In any case, the Diem régime proved reasonably effective and stable until 1959, four years after the estimate—a period about as long as any intelligence judgment can be projected with confidence and any particular policy can be expected to be viable. It is probably a moot point, therefore, whether the estimators or the policy-makers were right in terms of what they knew and what they said and did in 1954. What is worth noting for our purposes here is the readiness of the estimators to send forward a point of view very much at variance with the current policy "line." This attribute, comes through time and again over the succeeding years.<sup>5</sup>

The 1954 Estimate was but the first of many blinking yellow lights flashed from intelligence analysts to the Eisenhower, Ken-

<sup>5</sup> The Vietnam estimate of August 1954 was by no means the first example of this kind of objectivity; many estimates on East Asia written during the 1950s went squarely against the policy inclinations of the time.

nedy and Johnson administrations on the course of events in Vietnam. In August 1960, according to the "Pentagon Papers," the National Security Council was told that unless Diem's government took "more effective measures to protect the peasants and to win their positive coöperation" the Vietcong would expand their areas of control. If adverse trends were not checked, the estimate noted, "they will almost certainly in time cause the collapse of Diem's régime." Six months later officials in the new Kennedy administration were given an even sharper warning: "An extremely critical period . . . lies immediately ahead." Diem's "toleration of corruption" and his reliance on "one-man-rule" cast doubt on his ability to lead the government. And in October 1961, when Kennedy's NSC was considering deploying SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization) ground forces to Vietnam, it was cautioned that, "The communists would expect worthwhile political and psychological rewards from successful harassment and guerrilla operations against SEATO forces. The DRV (North Vietnamese Government) would probably not relax its Vietcong campaign against the GVN (South Vietnamese Government) to any significant extent." In November 1961, shortly after General Taylor and Walt Rostow returned from their trip to Vietnam recommending, *inter alia*, that the United States "offer to introduce into South Vietnam a military Task Force," a National Intelligence Estimate warned that any escalation of American military activities in Vietnam would be matched by a similar escalation by Hanoi: "the North Vietnamese would respond to an increased U.S. commitment with an offsetting increase in infiltrated support for the Vietcong." Kennedy turned down the recommended "Task Force," but approved a substantial increase in American military advisers.

In June 1964, CIA analysts challenged the validity of the hallowed "domino theory." According to the "Pentagon Papers," President Johnson asked the Agency: "Would the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control?" "With the possible exception of Cambodia," the President was told, "it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of Communism in the area would not be irreparable. . . ." So long as the United States retained its



## THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING

offshore bases in Asia, China and North Vietnam could be deterred "from overt military aggression against Southeast Asia in general." But, as President Johnson himself confides, the "domino theory" continued to dominate his thinking about Vietnam: "... from all evidence available to me it seemed likely that all of Southeast Asia would pass under Communist control, slowly or quickly, but inevitably, at least down to Singapore but almost certainly to Djakarta ..." if the United States "let South Vietnam fall to Hanoi."<sup>6</sup>

Intelligence officers apparently have been consistently bearish about the effectiveness of American bombing of North Vietnam. During late 1964, when a group of contingency planners were examining the costs and advantages of bombing North Vietnam, intelligence analysts took issue with those who maintained that bombing would force Hanoi to cease supporting the insurgency in South Vietnam: "We do not believe that such actions [*i.e.* bombing the North] would have a crucial effect on the daily lives of the overwhelming majority of the North Vietnam population. We do not believe that attacks on industrial targets would so exacerbate current economic difficulties as to create unmanageable control problems. ... [The Hanoi régime] would probably be willing to suffer some damage to the country in the course of a test of wills with the United States over the course of events in South Vietnam." As the Pentagon historians note, this view had little influence on the contingency paper which emerged.

In November 1965, after eight months of American bombing without any discernible effect on Hanoi's ability to continue the war, there was a quest for more "lucrative" targets. The Joint Chiefs proposed bombing North Vietnamese petroleum storage facilities, and Secretary McNamara asked for the views of the Board of National Estimates. "Hanoi would not be greatly surprised by the attacks," the Board responded. "Indeed ... it has already taken steps to reduce their impact. ... We believe that the DRV is prepared to accept for some time at least the strains and difficulties which loss of the major POL facilities would mean for its military and economic activity." After the petroleum storage facilities had been bombed in June 1966, it became clear that Hanoi had pre-positioned adequate oil caches throughout the country.

A month later, McNamara asked the Board to estimate the

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

effect on Hanoi of a substantial escalation of American ground and air activity. There must be many officials of the Johnson administration who now wish they had taken more cognizance of this in late 1965: "Present Communist policy is to continue to prosecute the war vigorously in the South. The Communists recognize that the U.S. reinforcements of 1965 signify a determination to avoid defeat. They expect more U.S. troops and probably anticipate that targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area will come under air attack. Nevertheless, they remain unwilling to damp down the conflict or move toward negotiation. They expect a long war, but they continue to believe that time is their ally and that their own staying power is superior." "An escalation of the bombing would not be decisive: the DRV would not decide to quit; PAVN [North Vietnamese Army] infiltration southward would continue. Damage from the strikes would make it considerably more difficult to support the war in the South, but these difficulties would neither be immediate nor insurmountable."

Throughout 1966 intelligence analysts were to continue to maintain that the American bombing of North Vietnam would not produce "either a military victory or early negotiations." During a sober moment of rethinking about the bombing in the spring of 1967, McNamara requested three intelligence assessments on this issue. According to the "Pentagon Papers," one CIA study concluded that 27 months of bombing "have had remarkably little effect on Hanoi's overall strategy in prosecuting the war, on its confident view of long-term communist prospects, and on its political tactics regarding negotiations." Another described North Vietnamese morale as one of "resolute stoicism with a considerable reservoir of endurance still untapped." And a third noted that although the bombing had "significantly eroded the capacities of North Vietnam's industrial and military bases," the damage had "not meaningfully degraded North Vietnam's material ability to continue the war in South Vietnam."

### III

The snippets of intelligence guidance which the "Pentagon Papers" reveal may not, of course, be the whole story of intelligence judgments offered and intelligence judgments heeded. The complete text of the documents which were cited may have couched the conclusions in a more tentative form; Intelligence

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Estimates and memoranda tend to be generously sprinkled with "on the one hand and on the other hand" and "on balance we believe." The Pentagon historians refer to other documents which countered or at least dissipated the effect of those prepared in the intelligence community as a whole or within the CIA itself. For example, the "Pentagon Papers" frequently refer to assessments of American bombing submitted by the Joint Chiefs which were typically more bullish than those generated within CIA or produced by the Office of National Estimates with contributions from and the concurrence of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The extent to which Defense Intelligence analysts had a hand in the Joint Chiefs' assessments is unknown, but one must assume that they played some role. Secretary McNamara may have become concerned about this apparent schizophrenic tendency within the Defense Intelligence staff because he tended, increasingly, to rely on the Board of National Estimates or other components within CIA for their own, uncoordinated, views on current or projected U.S. courses of action regarding Vietnam. Who besides McNamara was influenced by the CIA judgments, and who by the JCS, the "Pentagon Papers" do not say.

But they do indicate that the CIA's estimators and analysts, if not those within the Pentagon, appear to have passed the test of time, the sternest test of all. Confronting one of the most passion-laden, persistent and dangerous foreign crises the United States has confronted since World War II, they consistently seem to have kept their cool, they remained impeccably objective, and they have been right. But if the record was so good, why wasn't anyone Up There listening?

Sherman Kent, a seer among the professional intelligence analysts and a long-time Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, has said, "The nature of our calling requires that we pretend as hard as we are able that the wish is indeed the fact and that the policy-maker will invariably defer to our findings. . . ." He feels that his associates' concern about their influence is misplaced; "no matter what we tell the policy-maker, and no matter how right we are and how convincing, he will upon occasion disregard the thrust of our findings for reasons beyond our ken. If influence cannot be our goal, what should it be? . . . It should be to be relevant within the area of your competence, and above all it should be to be credible."

<sup>7</sup> Sherman Kent, "Estimates and Influence," *Foreign Service Journal*, April 1969, p. 16.

This exemplary admonition must be satisfying to Mr. Kent's co-professionals, but it is less than nourishing to those of us who are not as lofty-minded nor so high above the battle. Intelligence judgments on Vietnam, we now know, were both "relevant" and "credible" but were ignored or cast aside. Why? Because, since at least the early 1960s, they ran counter to the mood prevailing in the upper reaches of the policy-making community.

With the notable exception of Secretary McNamara (whose eventual change of view on the wisdom of our Vietnam policy may in no small part have been influenced by the seriousness with which he regarded CIA's assessments), senior officials seem to have dismissed the intelligence judgments as "just another opinion." It would be surprising if President Johnson had actually read the intelligence documents referred to in the "Pentagon Papers." Indeed, as he points out in his memoirs, the "Wise Men" he had assembled to examine American policy alternatives following the communists' 1968 Tet offensive were receiving "gloomier" assessments of the situation in Vietnam than he had been aware of. On important and sensitive political questions, intelligence judgments were virtually excluded from consideration. The State Department's Intelligence Bureau, for example, was cut off from the distribution of telegrams dealing with negotiations initiatives in 1966 and 1967, and thus was precluded from playing any useful role in this area. Intelligence analysts were thus banished to the darkness of official indifference. We know much less about the disposition of the Nixon administration, but it is no secret that the word has been passed down that Nixon officials are interested in "facts, not opinions."

#### IV

What can we realistically strive for in closing the yawning gap between the ultimate analytical product of an elaborate and costly intelligence structure and the tight if not always orderly process of arriving at national security and foreign policy decisions? Obviously, it is unrealistic to expect that policy-makers should be bound by the advice of intelligence analysts or even that intelligence judgments or guidance should be influential in every major decision; we already have acknowledged that other considerations may override intelligence assessments concerning the probable risks or advantages in a particular course of action. But the operative verb should be "override," not "disregard."

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We do have a right to expect that the findings of Intelligence Estimates be put forward in policy councils, pondered upon and then accepted or, by conscious decision, set aside.

The policy-making process comes into final focus and decisions are ultimately reached through oral rather than written communication. It is at this critical juncture that officials should perceive, as clearly as possible, "the effects a policy is likely to have." And it is at this point that the men whose *métier* it is to render such judgments should be directly involved. But long-standing practice has insulated the estimators from face-to-face confrontation with those who grapple with policy issues and options. Clearly if they are to play a more direct and useful role, the estimators must be brought out of their cloister into the real world. They must, in short, engage the policy-makers.

If not *the* Board of National Estimates, *a* Board should be given a broader charter which would assign it responsibilities well beyond that of presiding over National Intelligence Estimates. In effect, Board members should function within their special areas of experience and expertise as senior intelligence advisers to the policy community. The issues they should undertake or be called upon to examine and the nature of their participation obviously call for discrimination. The value of their contribution will stem from their unique opportunity to form considered judgments and to maintain cool objectivity; indiscriminate participation in every policy discussion is likely to erode both of these precious attributes to the point where they are just one more group in Washington living by its wits in an atmosphere of advocacy and passion.

The recent reorganization of the intelligence community provides an opportunity to increase the prestige and the influence of an Estimates Board. The Director of Central Intelligence has been relieved of his day-to-day responsibilities for running the Central Intelligence Agency and has been given greater authority over all the government's intelligence services. The Director in his new role will need a strong, knowledgeable policy support staff experienced in extracting, digesting and using the information and analysis available throughout the intelligence community. One way of meeting this need would be to provide the Director with a senior personal staff which would work closely on issues under consideration in high policy councils and represent him in consequential, subordinate forums.

Another, more draconic alternative for giving a greater emphasis to intelligence judgments would be to remove the estimating responsibility from the Central Intelligence Agency and place it within the National Security Council structure. In essence, this would expand the role of the new Net Assessments Staff created by the recent reorganization. Broad political and economic judgments as well as more quantitative assessments of the strategic balance could then be channeled directly into policy forums. Such a move would also give the estimators a more sensitive feel for policies under consideration. Close association with the policy element of the National Security Council would permit an Estimates Board to initiate intelligence analyses and estimates that would squarely confront national security issues in their early stages of review. Under these circumstances, estimates would be more relevant as well as more influential.

But what about objectivity, the quality that has distinguished the estimates over the years? The risk of sacrificing this in the quest for influence cannot be dismissed lightly. Obviously the objectivity-influence trade-off must be closely examined before giving the National Security Council ultimate responsibility in making intelligence judgments. On the assumption that the objectivity issue can be resolved, direct access to an Estimates Board by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and, on occasion, the President himself, would make available what every President since Truman has said he wanted, but what none of them has been able to obtain on a routine basis—the best possible first-hand intelligence judgments on critical international problems.

A move of this kind would obviously involve consequential changes in organization and philosophy within Washington's intelligence and policy hierarchies. It would also add to the influence on foreign policy exerted by the White House—an influence already a matter of congressional criticism and State Department concern. But, the price would appear tolerable if a more thoughtful and prudent approach to the world was the result.

Reprinted from The Friday Review of Defense Literature, May 4, 1973, p. 7.

### BOOKS

Prouty, L. Fletcher, THE SECRET TEAM: THE CIA AND ITS ALLIES IN CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973, 496 pp., \$8.95, reviewed by Harry Zubkoff, SAFAAR. (73-18)

(Note: Mr. Prouty is a retired Air Force colonel.)

Fletcher Prouty, a briefing officer from 1955 through 1963, was one of the focal points for contacts between the CIA and the DoD on military support of CIA's "special operations." In this unique position, he became extremely well informed about the covert activities carried out by CIA agents throughout the world. The men who receive the secret intelligence reports and make the decisions to undertake "special operations," are the members of the "Secret Team." Some of them are in Government, some in uniform, some in industry or in education, rotating in and out of official jobs but never losing their power to make or influence such decisions. Together, says Prouty, they have damaged the coherent conduct of foreign and military affairs, often to the detriment of American interests.

This book seeks to undermine their pervasive influence by exposing their activities. It is filled with startling assertions and a wealth of detail, obviously based on considerable research and a background of authentic experience. Moreover, it exposes a number of incidents in recent experience which were engineered by the "secret team," though outwardly there was no indication of such involvement. The celebrated "Pentagon Papers," for example, which played a major role in influencing national policies on Indochina, were not genuine Pentagon papers at all, but rather papers prepared mainly by people outside the Pentagon.

Prouty discusses at some length the organization and evolution of the CIA, from its original establishment in the post-World War II period to the present. Its intelligence coordinating functions, including the evaluation and dissemination of this information to proper authorities, have long since been expanded to include both the active collection of intelligence and the conduct of secret operations. The nature of these clandestine activities is also discussed at length, with the Cuban Bay of Pigs affair cited as a prime example of the manner in which the secret team can commit the US to a course of action without sufficient debate or study of the possible consequences. Over the years, these activities have expanded to the point where President Truman, who set up the CIA, assigned it specific missions, and made it organizationally subordinate to the Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the White.



House, conceded some time after he left office that it had gone far beyond its original purpose.

President Kennedy, too, became convinced that the CIA was exceeding its authority in many ways, but by that time the Agency had become so adept in exercising its power and influence that all attempts to control it were futile. The instructions and directives he issued, designed to place stricter controls over the CIA's activities, were simply taken over by the Agency to suit its own ends or ignored when they conflicted with its own objectives. In fact, all the Presidents since Truman have had to learn to live with the "nightmare" of CIA, and with the realization that they are almost powerless to control it. This "secret team," says Prouty must be "exposed, bared, and silenced;" above all, it "should be limited to the function of intelligence--and not a bit more."

## THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: time for review?

*The following report is reprinted from the December, 1972 F.A.S. Newsletter, publication of the Federation of American Scientists. The Federation, founded in 1946, is a national organization of natural and social scientists and engineers concerned with problems of science and society. It counts more than 25 Nobel Prize winners among its members.*

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, and its budget, pose many problems of traditional concern to the Federation of American Scientists: governmental reform, morality, proper use of high technology and defense expenditures. In the last quarter-century intelligence agencies have proliferated. The United States has established an agency that goes beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, interferes in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy has been developed apace. And the \$4-6 billion being spent for intelligence might well be termed the largest "unreviewed" part of the defense budget.

Twenty-five years after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA) seems a good time to consider the problems posed by these developments.

Of least concern in terms of its budget but of overriding significance in its international political impact is the Directorate of Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency, within which clandestine political operations are mounted. This [latter aspect] is the issue discussed in this newsletter. More and more, informed observers question whether clandestine political operations ought to be continued on a "business as usual" basis. In the absence of an investigation, a secret bureaucracy—which started in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during a hot war and which grew in the CIA during a cold war—may simply continue to practice a questionable trade.

Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other nations wrong?

Two decades ago, as the Cold War gained momentum, one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D. Lasswell, wrote a comprehensive and prophetic book, *National Security and Individual Freedom*. He warned of the "insidious menace" that a continuing crisis might "undermine and

eventually destroy free institutions." We would see, he predicted: pressure for defense expenditures, expansion and centralization of government, withholding of information, general suspicion, an undermining of press and public opinion, a weakening of political parties, a decline of the Congress and of the courts.

Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in order to re-examine our institutions, goals and standards. Which responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justify today?

The National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA and gave it overall responsibility for coordinating the intelligence activities of the several relevant government departments and agencies interested in such matters. Today, the CIA is reported to have a budget of about \$700 million to \$1 billion and a staff of perhaps 18,000 people, or about 8,000 more than the Department of State! (This advantage in size gives CIA an edge in interdepartmental meetings for which others may be too rushed to fully prepare, or not be able to assign a suitable person.)

The National Security Act authorized the CIA to: perform for the *benefit of the existing intelligence agencies* such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council (NSC) determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally;

perform such other functions and duties *related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to time direct* (italics added).

These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence collection, but they are also used to justify clandestine political operations. However, overthrowing governments, secret wars, assassination and fixing elections are certainly not done "for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies," nor are they duties "related to intelligence." Someday a court may rule that political activities are not authorized.

In any case, at the urging of Allen Dulles, the NSC issued a secret directive (NSC 10/2) in 1948 authorizing such special operations of all kinds—provided they were secret and small enough to be plausibly deniable by the Government. Even this authority has been exceeded, since several impos-

sible-to-deny operations have been undertaken: the U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian coup, the Laotian War, and so on.

The NSA gave the CIA no "police subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions. . . ." But another secret executive branch document evidently did give the CIA authority to engage in domestic operations related to its job. It was under this authority that such organizations as foundations, educational organizations and private voluntary groups were involved with the CIA at the time of the National Student Association revelations (1966).

### Clandestine Operations

The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the "black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably emphasize the intelligence, rather than the manipulation, function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrases that gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the desirability of *knowing* as much as possible. But its instincts oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home. And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may begin to be tolerated at home: how many elections can be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The last election showed such a degeneration of traditional American standards.

The present Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms [since publication, Mr. Helms has been replaced by James Schlesinger], is working hard and effectively at presenting an image of CIA that will not offend. In a recent speech, he said: "The same objectivity which makes us useful to our Government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. . . . We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa." Even construed narrowly, this is no easy job, and adapting clandestine political operations to American ideals may well be quite impossible.

At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy gave serious consideration to breaking the CIA into two pieces: one piece would conduct operations and the other would just collect intelligence. The dangers were only too evident to Kennedy of letting operations be conducted by those who were accumulating the information. Allen Dulles insisted on a united operation, arguing that separation would be inefficient and disruptive. But there are many arguments on both sides, and the issue deserves continuing consideration.

In particular, there is something to be said for

deciding now not to let Mr. Helms be succeeded by another Deputy Director for Plans (i.e. clandestine operations). This would otherwise tend to institutionalize the notion that the CIA itself is run by the organizers of clandestine activities rather than by those who do technical intelligence. Indeed, there is much to be said for a tradition of bringing in outsiders to manage the CIA.

The unprecedented secrecy concerning CIA's budget also deserves re-examination. It is being argued, in a citizen's suit, that it is unconstitutional to hide the appropriations of CIA in the budgets of other departments because the Constitution provides (Article I, Section 9, Clause 1) that:

*No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time (italics added).*

Not only CIA expenditures but the distorted budget reports of other agencies would seem to violate this provision. The petitioners call for a functional breakdown showing general categories of uses of CIA funds and a breakdown by nation showing where funds have been spent.

Certainly, there is little justification for hiding the total figure of CIA expenditures from the public and the Congress. This figure reveals less to any potential enemy than the size of the Defense Department budget—which we freely reveal. Releasing at least this overall figure would make unnecessary the hiding of the CIA budget in other agency budgets. This would stop an authorization and appropriation procedure that systematically and perennially misleads Congress and the public.

CIA's four divisions concern themselves with support, science and technology, intelligence, and plans. Press reports suggest that the personnel in these divisions number, respectively, 6,000, 4,000, 2,000 and 6,000.

The Intelligence Division examines open and secret data and prepares economic, social and political reports on situations. It is in the Plans Division that clandestine operations are undertaken. Former Deputy Directors for Plans have been: Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, Richard Bissell and, after 1962, Richard Helms—now the Director of CIA itself.

The most dramatic clandestine operations obviously have the approval of the President. But, as any bureaucrat knows, it can be hard for the President to say "no" to employees with dramatic ideas that are deeply felt. The U-2 and Bay of Pigs operations—both under the guidance of Richard Bissell

—reveal this phenomenon. In both cases the President (first Eisenhower, then Kennedy) went along with the plan reluctantly. In both cases the operation eventually embarrassed them greatly.

In the case of the U-2, President Eisenhower recalled saying: "If one of these planes is shot down, this thing is going to be on my head. I'm going to catch hell. The world will be in a mess." He often asked the CIA: What happens if you're caught? They would say: It hasn't happened yet. But it was obvious that it would happen eventually. . . . At what point would CIA itself have had the self-control to stop the flights?

We learned a great deal from the U-2 flights, though it was of much less direct significance to our security and tranquility than is commonly believed. The last U-2 flights still had not found any Soviet missiles other than test vehicles. But the information was too secret to be used even though it was known to the Russians. At home, missile gap was still a popular fear based on pencil and paper calculations of "capabilities" rather than "intentions or direct knowledge." Eventually, the flights destroyed a hopeful summit conference in 1960 and thus perpetuated dangerous tensions. Yet this was CIA's greatest clandestine success!

In the case of the Bay of Pigs operation, the disaster was complete. CIA supporters of the plan became its advocates and pressed it upon President Kennedy. According to some reports, they even led him to believe that the Eisenhower Administration had given the plan a go-ahead from which disengagement would be embarrassing. Once the invasion started, they pressed for more American involvement. The plan itself was, in retrospect, ludicrously ill-conceived. Despite the proximity of Cuba, intelligence about the likelihood of the necessary uprising was far too optimistic.

This failure had repercussions as well. It left the President feeling insecure and afraid that the Soviets thought him weak for not following through. It left the Soviets fearing an invasion of Cuba in due course. The stage was set for the missile crisis. Some believe that US involvement in Viet Nam was also encouraged by Kennedy's fear of being seen as too weak. [Thus] clandestine political operations obviously have far-reaching political consequences no one can predict.

The CIA recently brought suit against Victor Marchetti, formerly executive assistant to the Deputy Director, for not submitting to them for clearance a work of fiction about spying operations. It is evident that the CIA feared disclosures about clandestine operations or methods. The result was a

"prior restraint" order without precedent in which Marchetti is precluded from publishing anything about the CIA, fiction or not, without letting the CIA clear it. Thus a dangerous precedent against the traditional freedom of American press and publishing is now in the courts as a direct result of Government efforts to act abroad in ways that cannot be discussed at home. This is a clear example of the statement written by James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13, 1798): "Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad."

### The CIA and the Third World

For the clandestine (Plans) side of CIA, a large institutionalized budget now sees little future in the developed world. In the developed free world the stability of governments now makes political operations unnecessary. In the Communist developed world these political operations are largely impossible. Indeed, even intelligence collection by traditional techniques seems to have been relatively unsuccessful.

The penetration of the CIA by the Soviet spy Philby is said to have left the CIA with a total net negative balance of effectiveness for the years up to 1951. It completely destroyed the CIA's first "Bay of Pigs"—that effort to overthrow the Albanian Government in 1949, which cost the lives of 300 men.

The only really important clandestine Soviet source of information known publicly was Pankofsky. The public literature really shows only one other triumph in penetrating Soviet secrecy with spies: the obtaining of a copy of the secret speech by Khrushchev denouncing Stalin. But this speech was being widely circulated to cadre and Eastern European sources. Allen Dulles, on television, called this "one of the main coups of the time I was [at CIA]."

Compared to the Soviet Union, the underdeveloped world looks easy to penetrate and manipulate. The governments are relatively unstable, and the societies provide more scope for agents and their maneuvers. While the underdeveloped world lends itself better to clandestine operations, these operations are much harder to justify.

We are not at war—usually, not even at cold war—with [these] countries. And they rarely, if ever, pose a direct threat to us, whether or not they trade or otherwise consort with Communists. Today, fewer and fewer Americans see the entire world as a struggle between the forces of dark and light—a

struggle in which we must influence every corner of the globe.

In tacit agreement with this, CIA Director Helms recently said:

America's intelligence assets (sic), do not exist solely because of the Soviet and Chinese threat, or against the contingency of a new global conflict. The United States, as a world power, either is involved or may with little warning find itself involved in a wide range and variety of problems which require a broad and detailed base of foreign intelligence for the policy makers.

Thus, . . . the present justification for intelligence activities in the underdeveloped world springs ever more only from America's role as a "great power."

Moreover, the word "assets" above is significant. If information were all that were at issue, a strong case could be made for getting needed information, when you need it, through open sources, embassies and reconnaissance. But if clandestine political manipulation is at issue, then one requires longstanding penetration of institutions of all kinds and a great deal of otherwise unimportant information necessary to plan and hide local maneuvers.

Because political operations are so sensitive, and potentially so explosive, it is imperative that the agents be under strict control. But is this really possible? To each foreign movement of one kind or another—no matter how distasteful—the CIA will assign various operatives, if only to get information. In the process, these operatives must ingratiate themselves with the movement. And since they are operating in a context in which subtle signals are the rule, it is inevitable that they will often signal the movement that the US likes it, or might support it. Indeed, the agents themselves may think they are correctly interpreting US policy—or what they think it should be—in delicate maneuvers that they control. What, for example, did it mean when CIA agents told Cambodian plotters that they would do "everything possible" to help if a coup were mounted. (See *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 6, 1972, "CIA Role Bared in Sihanouk Ouster.")

#### What Are the Alternatives?

No one who has ever tried to control a bureaucracy will be insensitive to the problems to which these situations give rise. These problems would be dramatically diminished, however, if the CIA were restricted to information gathering and were known to be. The movements would then cease to look to the CIA for policy signals.

What alternative positions might be considered toward CIA involvement abroad? There are these alternative possibilities:

(1) *Prohibit CIA operations and agents from the underdeveloped world.* This would have the advantage of protecting America's reputation—and that of its citizens doing business there—from the constant miasma of suspicion of CIA involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. Open sources would continue to supply the US with 80 percent of its intelligence. Further intelligence in the underdeveloped world could be collected by State Department officials through embassies. This policy would enforce the now-questioned supremacy of the State Department in dealing with the nations involved.

Arguments against this policy include these: the area is too important to US interests to permit such withdrawal, and the credibility of the withdrawal would be hard to establish, at least in the short run.

(2) *Permit covert activities in the underdeveloped world only for information, not manipulation.* This policy would prevent the fixing of elections, the purchase of legislators, private wars, the overthrow of governments, and it would go a long way toward protecting the US reputation for noninterference in the affairs of other countries. One might, for example, adopt the rule suggested by Harry Howe Ransom that secret political operations be used only as an alternative to overt military action in a situation that presented a direct threat to US security.

Of course, the mere existence of a covert capability for espionage would leave the US with a capability for manipulation; the same agents who are secretly providing information could secretly try to influence events. But there is still a large gap between buying "assets" for one purpose and for the other.

Also, *large scale operations* would not be conducted under this rule. According to some reports, the committee, chaired by Maxwell Taylor, that reviewed the Bay of Pigs episode recommended to President Kennedy (who apparently agreed) that the CIA be limited to operations requiring military equipment no larger or more complex than side arms. . . .

(3) *Require that [appropriate] representatives of Congress be consulted before any clandestine operations, beyond those required for intelligence collection, are undertaken.* It is an unresolved dispute between the executive and legislative branches whether and when the executive branch may undertake operations affecting US foreign policy without consulting Congress. If a clandestine political operation is important enough to take the always high risks of exposure, it should be important enough to consult Congress. These consultations can produce a new perspective on the problem—which can be all important. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was one of the few who predicted accurately the political consequences of the Bay of Pigs operation.

(4) *Require that the Ambassador be advised of covert operations in the nation to which he is accredited; monitor compliance with Congressional oversight.* Under the Kennedy Administration, after the Bay of Pigs, a letter went to all embassies affirm-

ing the authority of the Ambassador over the representatives of CIA. But this authority is variously interpreted and might be periodically clarified and strengthened. One method of policing the order would involve occasional visits by Congressmen or Congressional staff, who would quiz the Ambassador to be sure that he knew at least as much as they did about local covert activities. Another control would require that Assistant Secretaries of State know about the covert activities in their region. In all cases, political oversight and political perspective would be injected into operations that would otherwise be largely controlled by an intelligence point of view.

One morally and politically important imperative seems clear: *Adopt and announce a firm rule against murder or torture.* There are repeated and persistent reports that this rule does not exist. There was the murder by a Green Beret. There is the Phoenix Program involving widespread assassination of "Vietcong agents"—many of whom, it is reported, were simply the victims of internal Vietnamese rivalries. Some years ago, *The New York Times* quoted one of the best informed men in Washington as having asserted that "when we catch one of them" [an enemy agent], it becomes necessary "to get everything out of them, and we do it with no holds barred."

There is also this disturbing quotation from Victor Marchetti:

The director would come back from the White House and shake his head and say "The President is very, very upset about \_\_\_\_\_. We agreed that the only solution was \_\_\_\_\_. But of course, that's impossible; we can't be responsible for a thing like that."

The second man would say the same thing to the third man, and on down through the station chief in some country until somebody went out and \_\_\_\_\_, and nobody was responsible. (*Parade*, "Quitting the CIA," by Henry Allen.)

### Infiltration and Manipulation

After the 1966 revelations that the CIA had been financing the National Student Association, a variety of front organizations and conduits [about 250] were unravelled. The CIA gave its money directly to foundations that, in turn, passed the secret funds along to specific CIA-approved groups, organizations and study projects. These, in turn, often supported individuals. The organizations included the National Education Association, African-American Institute, American Newspaper Guild, International Development Foundation and many others.

The way in which these organizations were controlled was subtle and sophisticated in a fashion apparently characteristic of many clandestine CIA operations. Thus, while distinguished participants in the Congress for Cultural Freedom and editors of its magazine, *Encounter*, evidently believed that the organizations were doing only what came naturally, the CIA official who set the entire covert

program in motion, Thomas W. Braden, saw it this way:

We had placed one agent in a Europe-based organization of intellectuals called the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Another agent became an editor of *Encounter*. The agents could not only propose anti-Communist programs, but they could also suggest ways and means to solve the inevitable budgetary problems. Why not see if the needed money could be obtained from "American foundations"? (*Saturday Evening Post*, May 20, 1967.)

President Johnson appointed a panel headed by Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to review this aspect of CIA operations. The other panel members were HEW Secretary John Gardner (a former OSS employee) and CIA Director Helms. The panel was to study the relationship between the CIA and those "educational and private voluntary organizations" that operate abroad and to recommend means to help assure that such organizations could "play their proper and vital role." The panel recommendations were as follows:

- (1) It should be the policy of the United States Government that no Federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations.
- (2) The Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities or organizations that are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.

On March 26, 1967, President Johnson said he accepted [the first recommendation] and directed all Government agencies to implement it fully. He said he would give "serious consideration to [the other] but apparently never implemented it.

When these operations were first proposed by Braden, Allen Dulles had commented favorably on them, noting, "There is no doubt in my mind that we are losing the Cold War." Twenty years later, though we are no longer in any risk of "losing the Cold War," some would like to continue despite the regulations.

At least one influential former CIA official's thinking was simply to move to deeper cover, . . . [but] what could such deeper cover be? . . . Commercial establishments or profit-making organizations are exempt from the ban. Hence, with or without the acquiescence of the officials of the company, CIA agents might be placed in strategic positions. It is possible also that organizations that seemed to be voluntary were actually incorporated in such a way as to be profit-making. Other possibilities include enriching individuals by throwing business their way and having these individuals support suitable philanthropic enterprises.

To the extent that these arrangements touch voluntary organizations, they pose the same problems that created the distress in 1966. In short, the policy approved by President Johnson was sensible when it proscribed "direct or indirect" support. More-



over, in the coming generation, we can expect a continuation of the existing trend toward whistleblowing. The CIA's reputation and its ability to keep secrets can be expected to decline. Even the most "indirect" support may eventually become known.

All of these deep-cover arrangements are made much easier by the intelligence community's so-called "alumni association." These are persons who are known to the community through past service and who are willing to turn a quiet hand or give a confidential favor. Sometimes, much more is involved. Examples from the past include these. A high official of OSS becomes head of the CIA-financed National Committee for a Free Europe. Another becomes an official of the CIA-funded American Friends of the Middle East. A deputy director of State Department Intelligence becomes president of Operations and Policy Research, Inc., a CIA conduit that financed "studies" of Latin American electoral processes. (This official is simultaneously well-placed to arrange studies of elections as the director of the American Political Science Association!)

Thus, a large and growing domestic network of persons trained in dissembling, distortion and human manipulation may be growing in our country. And the use of these kinds of skills may also be growing more acceptable. During the campaign for President a memorandum went out to Republican college organizers that urged them to arrange a mock election; it gave what seemed to be pointed hints about how to manipulate the election.

This kind of thing produces a suspicion and paranoia that divides Americans from one another. It makes them ask questions about their associates, colleagues, secretaries and acquaintances—questions that are destructive of the casual and trusting atmosphere traditional in America. (Already, unbelievable numbers of persons seem to assume that their phones are tapped and their mail read.)

### Keeping the CIA Honest

As the public sense of cold war dissipates, the American distaste for secret organizations can be expected to grow. The occasional disclosure of any "dirty trick" or political manipulation sponsored by CIA will certainly deepen this sense of unease. In the end, as now, many of the best and most sophisticated college graduates will not be willing to work for the CIA. And professional consultants will be discouraged as well. The result can change the character of the agency in such a way as to further threaten American values.

One method, in the American tradition, for keeping the CIA honest would be a public-interest organization of alumni of the intelligence community (and those who are serviced by intelligence in the Government). This public-interest group would, as do so many others, offer its testimony to Congress on matters of interest to it—in this case, intelligence. The testimony might be given in public or in executive session, as appropriate. And constructive suggestions and criticisms could be made.

Such an organization would have a credibility and authority that no other group can have and a general knowledge of the relevant intelligence problems facing the nation and public. It goes without saying that no one in this organization, or communicating with it, would violate laws, or oaths, associated with classified information. The Federation of American Scientists' strategic weapons committee is an example of the feasibility and legitimacy by which a group of persons well-grounded in strategic arms problems can, without violating any rules concerning such information, make informed and useful policy pronouncements. Many persons consulted in the preparation of the newsletter endorsed this suggestion.

In any case, as the distaste for the CIA grows, the CIA has a moral obligation to stay out of the lives of those who do not wish to be tarnished by association with it. In one country, it is reported, CIA put funds into the bank deposits of a political party without its knowledge. But what if this were discovered! Obviously, CIA could lightly risk the reputations of persons it wanted to use, or manipulate, by trying to help them secretly. . . .

In each house of Congress, the Armed Services and the Appropriations Committee have a subcommittee that is supposed, in principle, to oversee CIA. In the House of Representatives, even the names of the Appropriations subcommittee members are secret. In the Senate, the five senior members of the Appropriations Committee form a subcommittee on intelligence operations.

The subcommittee of Armed Services on CIA has not met for at least two years—although Senator Symington, a member of the subcommittee, has sought to secure such a meeting. In 1971, Senators John Stennis and Allen Ellender—then the Chairmen of the full Armed Services and Appropriations Committees (as well as of their CIA subcommittees) said they knew nothing about the CIA-financed war in Laos—surely CIA's biggest operation! (*Congressional Record*, Nov. 23, 1971, S19521-S19530.)



Congressmen are understandably reluctant even to know about intelligence operations. Without publicity, and public support, there is a limit to their influence over the events about which they hear. And if they cannot appeal to their constituencies, the knowledge of secrets only makes them vulnerable to the smear that they leaked a secret or mishandled their responsibilities.

Approximately 150 resolutions have been offered in the Congress to control the CIA and/or other intelligence functions. The most common resolution has called for a joint committee on intelligence, and there is much to be said for it. Such a renewal of Congressional authority to review such matters might strengthen Congressional oversight.

Two more recent efforts, both sponsored by Senator Symington, have tried different tacks. One resolution called for a select committee on the coordination of US Government activities abroad; such a committee would have authority over CIA and DOD foreign activities in particular. Another approach called for limiting the US intelligence expenditures of all kinds to \$4 billion.

Senator Clifford Case has sought to control the CIA by offering resolutions that simply apply to "any agency of the US Government." These resolu-

tions embody existing restraints on the Department of Defense (DOD) that CIA was circumventing: e.g., he sought to prevent expenditure of funds for training Cambodian military forces. In short, Senator Case is emphasizing the fact that CIA is a statutorily designed agency, which Congress empowered and which Congress can control.

Congress has . . . given the executive branch a blank check to do intelligence, but it has not even insisted on seeing the results. The NSA requires the CIA to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security *and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government . . .*" (italics added). As far as the legislative branch of "government" is concerned, this has not been done. On July 17, 1972, the Foreign Relations Committee reported out an amendment (S. 2224) to the NSA explicitly requiring the CIA to "inform fully and currently, by means of regular and special reports" the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of both houses and to make special reports in response to their requests. The Committee proposal, sponsored by Senator John Sherman Cooper, put special emphasis upon the existing precedent whereby the Joint Atomic Energy Committee gets special reports from DOD on atomic energy intelligence information. □

Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP80R01731R002100030026-2

# WHY "SPY" AGENCIES ARE BEING SHAKEN UP

**Drastic changes are aimed at ending rivalries and improving the usefulness of U. S. intelligence. One result: Some inner workings are being disclosed.**

The supersecret U. S. intelligence apparatus is being rocked from within on a scale never before so visible to the public.

What set off the tremor is a major overhaul, now in progress, of the machinery that produces the worldwide intelligence assessments on which crucial national decisions are based.

Under James R. Schlesinger, the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and overseer, also, of the vast U. S. information-gathering network—military as well as civilian—significant changes are being made. They have these objectives:

- To shake up the whole system and sharply improve its usefulness to the President and his top advisers.

- To process vital intelligence more effectively, at less cost.

Mr. Schlesinger cracked down on CIA, his home base, first. Now he is expected to focus on other parts of the intelligence community—military and civilian.

**Payroll reductions.** In the reorganization process, wholesale firings have occurred at the CIA—a cutback, sources say, of perhaps more than 1,000 of the agency's estimated 15,000 employees.

Some professionals assert that Mr. Schlesinger is bent on rooting out an "intellectually arrogant" clique that has been riding high in the CIA hierarchy for years.

Others counter that the chief purpose of the housecleanings is to enable the Nixon Administration to "politicize" the intelligence mechanism to its own ideological shape—and use Mr. Schlesinger to do it.

Both charges are vigorously denied by responsible people on all sides. Instead, the charges are cited as examples of the bitter bureaucratic infighting going on in Washington—and spreading into the intelligence system.

On one front, heated feuding between the CIA and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency—DIA—is out in the open.

Pentagon intelligence specialists, trying to regain control of assessing military threats to the U. S., are citing what they characterize as examples of blunders and bias by the CIA.

The military critics admit that their own mistakes a decade and more ago obliged the Government to turn to the civilian CIA for the main assessments on military threats. But now, the military men contend that DIA has been revamped, is more objective—and less of a lobby designed to scare Congress into voting higher defense budgets.

Against that background of turbulence, Mr. Schlesinger is moving to carry out the sweeping reorganization of the U. S. intelligence community originally ordered by President Nixon a year and a half ago—in November, 1971.

Knowledgeable sources say that Richard Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, was replaced by Mr. Schlesinger as CIA Director because he failed to carry out the overhaul mandate to Mr. Nixon's satisfaction.

A top man in the intelligence network put it this way: "The President and his national-security adviser, Henry Kissinger, just didn't think they were getting their money's worth."


The reorganization plan, in fact, is Mr. Schlesinger's own handiwork. He drafted it while serving as Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Later, he was named Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission—the job from which he was transferred to his present post as America's "superspy."

Like Mr. Helms before him, Mr. Schlesinger is not only Director of the CIA but also Director of Central Intelligence—DCI. That makes him boss of all American intelligence operations.

**New faces.** One thing that Mr. Schlesinger has done is to put together what he calls the intelligence community staff, with offices on the top floor of the CIA headquarters building in a Virginia suburb of Washington.

Significantly, two military-intelligence

## THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE NETWORK AND WHAT IT DOES



James Schlesinger, Dir. of Central Intelligence, presides over the US Intelligence Board, which sets intelligence requirements and priorities.

Represented on the board are--

**CIA** Central Intelligence Agency, top-secret Government organization, responsible only to the White House, collects and evaluates intelligence information, runs clandestine missions abroad, conducts espionage and counter-espionage.



CIA Director James R. Schlesinger, who oversees all U. S. intelligence, designated two military men among deputies.



Maj. Gen. Lew Allen



Maj. Gen. Daniel Graham

experts have been assigned to that staff as Mr. Schlesinger's deputies. One is Maj. Gen. Lew Allen, of the Air Force, who has been nominated for promotion to lieutenant general. The other is Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, of the Army, a career intelligence officer.

General Graham, who has been deputy director for estimates in the Pentagon's CIA, sounded a call in an article he wrote recently for "Army" magazine asserting a dominant role for the military in estimating security threats. May 1 was set as the date of his move to Mr. Schlesinger's staff.

As the shake-up of the intelligence establishment continues, charges and countercharges are giving Americans a rare look at its inner workings and hot spots. For example:

- Military men are alleging that "bias" of top-level CIA evaluators colors final estimates sent on to the President and his aides.

One case cited by a critic of the CIA:

"An estimate entitled 'New Order in Brazil' was prepared as a basis for

policy decisions. Use of the term 'New Order' in the title was like overprinting a Nazi swastika on the cover. It painted the blackest possible picture of the present Brazilian Government, making Brazil look like an imminent threat to the U. S. If the President had acted on that report, he would have cut all aid to Brazil."

- The CIA is accused of failing to use information it had in hand to alert the White House to Russia's acute food shortage last year. The point made is that the Soviets were able to negotiate a billion-dollar grain deal with the U. S. on terms favorable to the Kremlin—and unfavorable to the American housewife, who had to pay more for bread.

The CIA answers this charge by contending that the information was passed along to the Department of Agriculture, which, in the CIA view, failed to act on it promptly enough.

- A military intelligence official says that before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the CIA director of estimates offered a report prepared for the President saying there would be no invasion. An aide, disagreeing, used various stratagems to avoid forwarding the report. The delay prevented embarrassment for the CIA when the Russians did invade, but, according to the

source, the aide who blocked the estimate "won no friends."

- In Vietnam, it is now revealed, CIA and DIA were often at odds. For instance, they agreed that some Communist arms were reaching South Vietnam through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville, but both were "wildly wrong" on how much. But an official, not in intelligence, recalls that CIA was "much further wrong" than DIA—although each was on the low side.

- Another charge by critics of the CIA: After the Tet offensive of 1968, CIA reported Communists had seized vast portions of the countryside, because contact was lost with most sources outside the cities. This assumption was disproved by on-the-spot checks by DIA teams in helicopters.


An illustration of conflict between civilian and military analysts:

In a recent national estimate, the CIA took the position that Japan would never consider arming itself with nuclear weapons. The DIA argued that the Japanese were keeping abreast of nuclear technology and would not hesitate to "go nuclear" if Tokyo felt that was necessary for survival.


When the document was brought to Mr. Schlesinger, an insider says, the CIA analysts emphasized that they had put their views first, as the current position, and the DIA estimates were relegated to the back pages. Mr. Schlesinger was said to have "hit the roof" and to have ordered that the military view be given equal prominence.

- General Graham, in his writing in "Army" magazine, admits serious DIA shortcomings in the past. He charges that Pentagon intelligence has damaged its own status by inflating its estimates of threats to the "worst case" possible—

(continued on next page)



In addition, Treasury Department provides economic and financial information on other countries.



Wide World Photo

Overhaul of U. S. intelligence network is creating tension at CIA's massive headquarters near Washington.

## "SPY" SHAKE-UP

[continued from preceding page]

in order to get more money from Congress. He claims that this tendency has been largely eliminated.

• General Graham also charges that, in the past, military intelligence has been too prone to tailor its assessments to the need "users" have for intelligence that "supports the program."

**Assessing blame.** In some instances, blame is being heaped upon both civilian and military intelligence agencies. One thing pointed out is that the entire U. S. intelligence community—despite warnings from some agents—refused to believe that Soviet boss Nikita Khrushchev would dare to risk putting offensive missiles in Cuba in 1962.

Khrushchev did just that, however, and the "missile crisis" resulted.

Some of the military intelligence experts now insisting on a stronger voice in the evaluation of raw data concede that, in the past, the armed forces have been supplied with exaggerated estimates of the Soviet threat—such as the "missile gap" of a decade ago that turned out to be nonexistent.

It is pointed out, however, that the DIA has had a thorough housecleaning in recent years.

**"Time to reassert."** In his article for "Army" magazine, General Graham wrote:

"... I think the time is ripe for the military profession to reassert its traditional role in the function of describing military threats to national security. Both the military user and the military producer of strategic intelligence have come a long way since the 'missile gap' days. DIA has hit its stride in the production of respectable military estimates."

Many CIA professionals in top and middle ranks are unhappy about the

reorganization. A com-

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point: "What is happening is that those who seek to present intelligence as it is, rather than as the situation is seen by those supporting specific policies, are being plucked out."

Aides of Mr. Schlesinger deny that he has any intention of "politicizing" the agency. They point out that at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee he said he was determined to maintain the independence and integrity of intelligence evaluations.

Within the Nixon Administration, dissatisfaction with the CIA has centered particularly in the National Security Council staff, which is under the direction of Mr. Kissinger.

The main complaint has been that evaluations of raw intelligence often reflected the biases of top men.

To that, one CIA man retorts:

"We feel that we do a better job of evaluating raw intelligence without bias than the military does—or, for that matter, than people like Kissinger who are defending a specific policy."

The argument is made that—particularly since the days when the late Allen Dulles was its Director—the CIA's "controlling voice" in the intelligence community has sought intelligence estimates unaffected by the policies of the Administration in power, the Pentagon, the so-called military-industrial complex, or any other group.

**Changes in the works.** Whatever the merits of the arguments now boiling, drastic changes are being made by Mr. Schlesinger.

They include:

1. To reduce costs, overlapping intelligence agencies are to submit "bids" on operations that are assigned by President Nixon and the National Security Council. The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, set up under the 1971 reorganization plan, is to consider the competing "bids" and accept the least expensive if the bidder can convince the Committee that his agency can do the job.

2. Mr. Schlesinger is making it clear that he will exercise fully his authority over all of the intelligence services. In the past, this has been a difficult problem for the Director of Central Intelligence, because the Defense Department gets most of the money and most of the manpower.

3. As DCI, Mr. Schlesinger will decide which of the U. S. intelligence agencies—military and civilian—will carry out operations assigned by the White House.

4. Each agency is to be kept fully

others are doing. 5. Cost experts are combing through all operations to determine how to use fewer men and spend less money.

**"To be continued."** Some projects are being phased out as inefficient or outmoded. One report indicated a sharp curtailment in clandestine operations. But an insider commented:

"They may not talk about these as much as they did, but like it or not, these activities are part of the way of life in the world today, and they will be continued."

One revision put into effect by Mr. Schlesinger has to do with preparation of CIA reports requested by the President and other high officials.

**Condensed intelligence.** Previously, such requests were answered with detailed studies—20, 30, or even 50 pages long. Now, the reports run no longer than three double-spaced pages. A CIA official explained:

"Instructions from Schlesinger are to answer the questions asked—and no more. No background. No historical discussion. Just keep in mind that the President or the Secretary of the Treasury or whoever else asks the questions is a busy man. He rarely has time to read long reports. What he needs is for use right now—today—in order to make a decision."

The telephone number of the analyst or working group responsible for the report appears on the document, so if more information is needed, it can be obtained without delay.

In line with Mr. Nixon's efforts to reduce federal spending, the intelligence agencies are under orders to reduce costs.

Just how much is being spent to piece together the information essential to national security is not a matter of public knowledge.

**A 6.2 billion cost?** Senator William Proxmire (Dem.), of Wisconsin, estimated recently that the cost of gathering military and civilian intelligence is 6.2 billion dollars a year. But Albert C. Hall, Assistant Defense Secretary for Intelligence, said that Mr. Proxmire's figure is "just plain wrong."

Without hinting at the actual figures, Mr. Hall said that the Pentagon's intelligence budget has been cut by about a third in the last three years.

Other sources say that manpower in the CIA and the other intelligence services, including the National Security Agency, now totals less than 125,000—a reduction of more than 25,000 since 1971.

Thus, a money crunch and diminished manpower are added problems at a time of sharp change and open conflict for the agencies which function as the "eyes and ears" of the United States around the world.

[END]

CLASS COMPOSITION AY 1973-74

US AIR FORCE. . . . .	252 (36 Former Prisoners of War)
US AIR NATIONAL GUARD . . . . .	6
US AIR FORCE RESERVE. . . . .	6
US ARMY . . . . .	16
US NAVY . . . . .	10
US COAST GUARD. . . . .	1
US MARINE CORPS . . . . .	6
CIVILIAN* . . . . .	10

ALLIED OFFICERS:

ROYAL AF  
CANADIAN AF  
AUSTRALIAN AF  
GERMAN AF  
IRANIAN AF

TOTAL ALLIED OFFICERS. . 9

TOTAL	<u>316</u>
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\*DEPT OF STATE: DIA: DSA: FAA etc.

NOTE: ALL ARE COLONEL OR LT. COLONEL OR COMPARABLE GRADE.

# AIR WAR COLLEGE bulletin


Volume 1, Number 1, Edition 1973-1974





# AIR WAR COLLEGE BULLETIN

Twenty-eighth Edition 1973-1974



## AIR WAR COLLEGE COAT OF ARMS

The traditional lamp of knowledge in gold represents the educational mission of the school. The three gold lightning flashes in a field of blue represent the school aim of success in war. The silver stylized futuristic swept aerodynamic shape with a field of red below represents the power of the future and upward flight.

The Air War College was presented the Outstanding Unit Award by the US Air Force in 1967. The red and blue ribbon is emplaced over the AWC shield.



## *MISSION*

**To prepare senior officers for high command and staff duty by developing in them a sound understanding of military strategy in support of national security policy to insure an intelligent contribution towards the most effective development and employment of aerospace power.**

This publication has been reviewed and approved by competent personnel of the preparing command in accordance with current directives on doctrine, policy, essentiality, propriety, and quality.



## *FOREWORD*


The Air War College is the senior Air Force school of professional military education. This bulletin constitutes the official statement of the Resident Programs and the Associate Programs for the academic year 1972-73 and is intended to serve as an information guide to our students, guests lecturers, visitors, and friends. It contains basic information on the mission, history, objectives, philosophy, organization of the College, course content, and instructional methodology.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read 'L. S. Lightner'. The signature is stylized and fluid.

*L. S. LIGHTNER*  
*Major General, USAF*  
*Commandant*

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
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## HISTORY

DURING World War II experiences of Army Air Corps leaders clearly demonstrated the great importance of the old Air Corps Tactical School. At the end of the war, these leaders undertook the task of planning a comprehensive professional educational system for the greatly expanded Army Air Corps. The Air War College is the apex of this system.

On 12 March 1946, War Department letter AG 352 dated 12 March 1946 redesignated the Army Air Force School to Air University and concurrently established the Air War College effective 12 March 1946, to prepare selected officers for the employment of large Air Force units and to insure the most effective development of the Army Air Forces. Throughout the years, this mission has kept pace with changing concepts of air power and the expanding role of the senior officer in a military structure shaped by continuous international tensions and increased technology.




*Austin Hall*

Austin Hall, the headquarters building of the old Air Corps Tactical School, was the first home of the Air War College, which opened on 3 September 1946 with General Carl Spaatz' dedication of Air University. The College opened with a faculty and staff of 25 officers, 7 enlisted personnel, and 18 civilians. Registration of students began on 4 September 1946 with 45 Air Force, 5 Army, 2 Marine Corps and 3 Royal Air Force officers. Except for a decline during the Korean conflict, the size of the student body increased steadily to an all-time high of 284 in the 1966 class. The Vietnam conflict resulted in a reduction to 146 and 148 students for the 1968 and 1969 classes.

## FORMER COMMANDANTS

## AIR WAR COLLEGE



*Commandant's Office*



ORVIL A. ANDERSON  
Major General  
1 Jun 46 — 1 Sep 50



ROBERT J. GOEWY  
Colonel  
29 Apr 54 — 25 Jul 54



LEO P. DAHL  
Major General  
1 Dec 60 — 31 Jul 62



ROBERT TAYLOR, 3D  
Major General  
1 Aug 62 — 13 Jun 64



ARNO H. LUEHMAN  
Major General  
18 Aug 64 — 12 Aug 66



JOHN DeF. BARKER  
Major General  
2 Sep 50 — 1 Aug 51



JOHN A. SAMFORD  
Major General  
2 Aug 51 — 17 Oct 51



ROSCOE C. WILSON  
Major General  
18 Oct 51 — 28 Apr 54



DELMAR T. SPIVEY  
Major General  
26 Jul 54 — 15 Jun 56



ROBERT F. TATE  
Major General  
3 Sep 56 — 30 Jun 59



RICHARD H. CARMICHAEL  
Major General  
1 Jul 59 — 30 Nov 60



JERRY D. PAGE  
Major General  
15 Aug 66 — 31 Jan 67



R. A. BREITWEISER  
Major General  
23 Feb 67 — 27 Jun 67



JACK N. DONOHEW  
Major General  
5 Sep 67 — 17 Dec 71

- Be able to evaluate national security issues and propose alternate courses of action.
- Make a contribution to the solution of Department of Defense problems.
- Make rational decisions and successfully communicate ideas.
- Perform effectively as a senior commander or staff officer.
- Be an articulate advocate of aerospace power.

## EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

The nation requires strong military forces led by officers who are educated and trained in the profession of arms and who are capable of making an ordered application of military resources to attain national goals and objectives.

Since professions are founded on the mastery of a body of knowledge and its expert application, the Air War College provides its students with an opportunity to gain a thorough and timely education in professional military subject matter essential for competent performance of duty at the highest command and staff levels. It does not concern itself with technical or military specialty education and training. Instead, it is dedicated to the exploration and development of knowledge, skills, and attitudes significant to the profession of arms, particularly aerospace power.

The Air War College student is a mature and successful officer who has demonstrated potentiality for higher levels of responsibility in his profession. He is entering the most important phase of his career. Upon leaving the Air War College and taking up his new assignment, his principal task is that of the military professional playing his part in the preparation for, and in the orderly application of, force in support of US national objectives. Fundamental to this task is the requirement to develop a high degree of flexibility in weapon systems, tactics, and strategy in order to control the escalation of conflict under a wide variety of international situations.

The Air War College student must be a competent, flexible, creative, and adaptable individual who can play his full part in the overall defense structure unhampered by convention or preconceived ideas. He must be intellectually honest, articulate, and trained in logical mental processes; he must constantly strive for increased professional competence and practice a high code of ethical and moral behavior; he





*Guest Speakers*

should be a knowledgeable spokesman for military doctrine, concepts, and strategy.


The Air War College uses a wide variety of instructional methods which challenge and motivate its students. Whatever the method, however, an atmosphere of intellectual academic freedom and open discussion is encouraged and nourished. This includes a thorough, analytical examination and evaluation of competing points of view and diverse military doctrines, policies, and strategies.

Study in depth of essential, critical areas is undertaken rather than cursory coverage of a wide range of subject matter. The Air War College concerns itself with principles, concepts, strategies, theories, and criteria for the development and employment of aerospace forces, and with those attitudes and skills necessary to their application through the total spectrum of conflict. Aerospace power is studied in the context of total US military power which implies an appreciation and understanding of the roles of other US services and the part they play in the total defense structure. The curriculum includes treatment of the objectives, doctrines, capabilities, and related problems of allied and potential enemy forces. Other areas are covered only when they are essential to the comprehension of the primary body of military knowledge. Emphasis is placed upon analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of military concepts and doctrine, as opposed to the mere acquisition of knowledge. Air War College students develop their abilities to weigh evidence, evaluate conclusions critically, and select sound courses of action affecting national security. They develop sufficient flexibility to consider and devise a wide variety of strategic concepts. Students and faculty examine current and future Air Force problems with a view toward contributing to their solutions.

Through a dynamic and forward-looking curriculum, the school maintains an atmosphere in which students are challenged to achieve the maximum growth of which they are capable. Maximum individual responsibility, initiative and creativeness are encouraged in each student. Students are guided, taught, and counseled by a faculty of professional officers with extensive knowledge and experience in appropriate subject matter areas. These officers are active as teachers, researchers and contributors to professional military knowledge and are a source of motivation and inspiration to the students. The Air War College uses appropriate techniques of evaluation to assess the effectiveness of its programs and the achievement of its students. Evaluation encourages the staff, faculty, and students to maintain high standards of excellence and measures progress toward established program goals.



## AIR WAR COLLEGE ORGANIZATION




\* Principal duty in Dept of Military Strategy  
 -- Primary assignment to Commander, Air University

The Commandant is responsible for the operation of the College and the fulfillment of its assigned mission. He is assisted by a Vice Commandant, an advisory staff, and four staff directors. The advisory staff consists of representatives of the Department of State, the US Army, the US Navy, the US Marine Corps, Air National Guard, and the Royal Air Force. The Directors include a Director of Administration, a Director of Evaluation, a Director of Associate Programs, and a Director of Resident Programs. The Director of Resident Programs is assisted by an Educational Advisor as is the Director of Associate Programs.

The Air War College student body is organized as a class and as separate seminars. The class as a whole is represented by a Class President, the senior US Air Force line officer in the class. The student body is divided into seminars for study, discussion, and problem solving.

One faculty member is assigned to each seminar and is designated a Faculty Seminar Leader. Similarly, a member of the faculty is assigned to individual research projects and is designated a Professional Studies Advisor.



# RESIDENT PROGRAM

## CURRICULUM



*Research*

The Air War College curriculum stresses military subjects, particularly those concerned with aerospace power. The curriculum emphasizes study in specific subjects and problems rather than broad coverage of a variety of general topics and includes study of military capabilities organized around functional forces instead of the parent service organization. It is highly integrated and internally consistent with each successive part closely related to, and dependent upon, every other part. A major portion of the academic year is devoted to a thorough and critical analysis of current strategy with a view to the development of optimum alternative future strategies. The course provides for an in-depth evaluation of US and allied capabilities as they may be applied across the broad spectrum of conflict. It also includes instruction in the use of modern analytical techniques used by DOD to evaluate competing strategies, weapons systems, and weapon effectiveness. The curriculum allows for a wide range of individual differences in experience and ability among students and provides ample opportunity for student-faculty research on current problems facing the Air Force.

AIR WAR COLLEGE CURRICULUM  
1973 - 1974

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY
REGISTRATION	(31 Jul)											
ORIENTATION	(1 - 3 Aug)											
AREA I	NATIONAL AND WORLD ENVIRONMENT											
AREA II	COMMAND & MANAGEMENT											
AREA III	MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIES											
	SENIOR OFFICER ORIENTATION COURSE											
AREA IV	NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES											
	NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM											
	PROFESSIONAL STUDIES PROGRAM											
	ELECTIVES PROGRAM											
	GRADUATION											



**Area I** \_\_\_\_\_ *National and World Environment* provides a foundational basis for the topics to be treated during the academic year and establishes the curriculum theme. Environment is covered from five topical perspectives: (1) A Survey of Critical Issues; (2) The Changing International Environment; (3) Domestic Issues; (4) Threats to US Security and Well Being; and (5) The Formulation of National Security Policy. The first perspective highlights the critical national, international and military issues to be faced by the US now and in the foreseeable future. The second perspective treats international systems and the major issues that effect the behavior of nations. In the third perspective, modern American Society is examined with attention given to the issues that bear on US national policy. External threats to the United States are covered in the fourth perspective with major emphasis being placed on the USSR and the PRC. The fifth and final perspective provides a detailed examination of the role and influences of various groups and agencies on the formulation and implementation of national security policy.

**Area II** \_\_\_\_\_ *Command and Management* includes the study of the management of defense resources both human and material. The student is exposed to the senior officer's problems of command and leadership in the current environment and to the recent developments in management science applicable to the defense establishment, including microeconomics, information processing, analytical decision making, systems analysis, the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), and other defense resource management systems.

**Area III** \_\_\_\_\_ *Military Capabilities and Strategies* addresses the changing nature of armed conflict. Classic writings are examined to highlight the fundamental relationship of war and politics. A survey of modern doctrine for the employment of military forces leads to analysis of recent politico-military actions in which the effective application of airpower is stressed. Reserve forces senior officers join the resident class as the impact of modern weapons is evaluated in a thorough study of service capabilities and the responsibilities of US unified and specified commands. An examination of US/allied military relationships is complemented by strategic area studies and selected foreign perspectives, then culminated in a warfare planning exercise for the employment of theater air forces.

**Area IV** \_\_\_\_\_ *National Security Issues* examines crucial issues facing our nation in a changing international environment and explores strategic alternatives available to world powers (US, allied and opposing) including probable courses of action to be pursued by each in support of national interests. Students actively debate US security issues and participate in a politico-military game which focuses on crisis management of a complex conflict situation. Knowledge gained in the preceding months is applied in a culminating study requiring analysis, evaluation and synthesis of alternative military concepts, doctrine and strategies to attain national objectives through application of the military element in coordination with all other instruments of national power. The National Security Forum is also conducted during Area IV. The last week of Area IV is devoted to the "Future of the Military Services" during which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of the respective military services air their views on the future role for the military.

## METHODOLOGY



The Air War College mission establishes requirements to broaden student perspectives and to develop a capacity for treating military problems objectively with facility and competence. These requirements and the high experience level of the students have resulted in the selection of appropriate methods of instruction which best achieve the educational objectives of the College.

The lecture method is employed to the extent necessary to provide coverage of subjects required by all students. In the introductory phases of the course, there are a greater number of lectures than in the final phases. In the final phases, the students and faculty, individually and in groups, make critical analyses of military capabilities and develop alternative national strategies.

Seminars supplement lectures and individual student research. They afford opportunities for small groups of students to participate in informal discussion with visiting specialists. The seminars further provide students with valuable experience in conducting discussion groups, in extemporaneous presentation of ideas and viewpoints, and in the analysis of problems under discussion.

Post-lecture seminars are chaired by a Faculty Seminar Leader whose primary task is to insure that the purpose and scope of the instruction periods are achieved. Many sessions are student-led.

Problem-solving seminars are conducted for the purpose of developing solutions to selected problems. Problems posed for discussion are credible, relevant, and meaningful, and contribute to a better understanding of the subjects in the formal curriculum. They include case studies, current topical studies, and hypothetical problems requiring the exercise of newly acquired knowledge and techniques for their solution.

Daily required reading assignments provide differing points of view and a better understanding of each day's topic. These assignments are also a principal source of information and stimulus in preparation for discussion groups and seminar problems.

In the Professional Studies Program, students undertake research projects dealing with real, current, and anticipated Air Force problems. This activity is fundamental to the full achievement of curriculum objectives, and students devote a significant portion of their time to the effort. This program aids in solving vital problems facing the military services and the DOD. In addition, it attempts to teach the student to organize and treat complex research and study projects. Appropriate research topics are solicited from HQ USAF and the major commands and coordinated with other studies in similar areas.



## SPECIAL PROGRAMS

### SENIOR OFFICERS' ORIENTATION COURSE

During Area III, the Air War College conducts a week-long intensive course for senior officers of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. Participants in the course are normally full colonels or general officers and they are assigned to resident host seminars for the week. The course is integrated with the full resident program schedule for part of the week. During the balance of the week, the course is comprised of lectures and discussions on threat analysis and national strategy. This exchange of information and perceptions between course participants and AWC students is always well received and is considered a major highlight of the academic year.

### NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM

During Area IV, the Air War College conducts the National Security Forum. Each year approximately 70 prominent civilian leaders from industry, education, government and professional fields participate in the Air War College program on a peer basis in a week-long forum. The objectives are to broaden the professional background of the Air War College students by an exchange of ideas with distinguished civilians, provide civilian guests with an increased understanding of national security problems through the discussion of vital issues, and to demonstrate the Air War College philosophy of education for senior officers.

### FIELD TRIPS

The specific objectives of the curriculum are served by student field trips that are phased in with, and related to, the curriculum area being covered. These trips are conducted as educational exercises and are designed to provide firsthand acquaintance with problem situations in their "real world" environment. The emphasis is placed on obtaining a realistic conception of operations that are vital to the security of the country. Every effort is made to provide students with opportunities for meaningful dialogue with top level commanders, managers, and key executives.

## ELECTIVES PROGRAM

The resident program at the Air War College is supplemented by a concurrent program of graduate-level study designed to enable students to broaden their backgrounds and become better informed as articulate advocates of aerospace power. Selected disciplines and environmental subjects fundamental to the College mission and beneficial to the professional knowledge of the students are provided in the electives program.




## EVALUATION

The Air War College evaluation program has the twofold purpose of evaluating the curriculum and measuring student progress toward attainment of educational goals. The objectives are to insure that the curriculum is accurately responsive to the needs of the Air Force and that the Air War College is accomplishing its mission. The evaluation program provides data for curriculum planning and for improving instruction. Evaluation enhances student motivation, assists the student in self-analysis, and encourages self-improvement through counseling. Through the evaluation process, the College accumulates information for student training reports, and selects Distinguished Graduates.

The student evaluation program depends on disciplined and objective faculty and staff observation. The curriculum evaluation program obtains inputs from staff and faculty and students, guidance from higher headquarters, and advice from civilian and military specialists.

## FACULTY



The faculty of the Air War College consists of officers especially selected for their professional backgrounds, skills, knowledge, and capabilities to fill specific positions. These officers have outstanding records and must possess advanced degrees. Faculty members are generally serving in the grade of colonel and are graduates of the Air War College or other senior service school.

The faculty prepares and implements the curriculum. They deliver platform lectures, teach elective courses, conduct general discussion seminars, supervise individual and group research, and moderate problem-solving sessions. As advisors and seminar leaders, they evaluate and counsel students. They prepare instructional materials and directives and maintain competence in their fields of specialization, and the overall program of the Air War College. In addition, faculty members are encouraged to conduct individual research, write for publication, and participate in professional organizations. These pursuits develop personal capabilities and enhance the professional military stature of the faculty members.



## ASSOCIATE PROGRAMS

From a beginning in 1947 as the Air War College Extension Course, the Associate Programs now consist of a correspondence course and a seminar course. The mission, objectives, and philosophy of the Air War College apply to both the Resident Program and the Associate Programs. The purpose of the Associate Programs is to provide professional military education to those senior officers who are unable to attend the Air War College in residence.

Active duty Air Force officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel or above, officers of comparable rank from the other services, US Federal civilian employees, GS-13 or above, and majors on a selection list for lieutenant colonel are eligible for enrollment in the Seminar Program. Non-active air reservists, members of both the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard may also enroll in that program on a space available basis. The Correspondence Program accepts active and inactive duty officers and civilian employees in the above grades, majors who have completed a command and staff level course either in residence or by correspondence, and foreign military personnel if they are serving in an exchange assignment with the U.S. Air Force or attending a formal U.S. Air Force course of education or training conducted in the United States. Current enrollment is approximately 2200 students in the Correspondence Program and 1600 students in the Seminar Program. Both programs require up to two years to complete.

Students achieve the objectives of the Correspondence Program through individual or group study. The group study method has been endorsed by the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Civil Air Patrol. All correspondence students must complete specified reading assignments, written requirements, and objective tests. The Air War College faculty provides individual guidance and evaluation.


The Seminar Program provides for the conduct of seminars consisting of 15-18 senior active duty officers and high-level civilian employees at selected Air Force bases. This program offers the advantages of both guided self-study and group discussion. Members of the Air War College faculty visit seminars at regular intervals. All seminars meet once a week for a two-hour period to discuss the subjects included in this specifically adapted version of the Air War College resident curriculum. Students are also required to complete specified reading assignments and written requirements and to make oral presentations. The written requirements are individually evaluated by members of the Air War College faculty.

The texts for both the Seminar and Correspondence Programs consist of four volumes of reading selections, each of which comprises twenty chapters. Each chapter contains a statement of the lesson objective, an introduction to the subject being studied, suggested topics for study, required readings, and a list of references for those desiring to do supplementary reading.

## AUDITORIUM and FACILITIES

### AUDITORIUM


Jones Auditorium, a newly constructed facility, has a seating capacity of 450. Adjustable lecterns are positioned on the left and right sides of the speaker's platform. The host officer moderates discussion periods from the second lectern. Lapel microphones are available for speaker use during lecture and discussion periods. The auditorium sound system picks up questions from the floor area through hand sets dispersed around the seating area. The auditorium is fully climate controlled and has lighting controls to meet all visual presentation needs. An enclosed booth is provided for late arrivals and VIP visitors at the back of the auditorium.



## SMALL AUDITORIUMS

Five smaller auditoriums in Anderson Hall have seating capacities of 55 each, and are equipped with lecterns and chalkboards.

*Room 278F*



## EQUIPMENT



*Television Camera*

The following equipment is available for use in the main lecture room:

- a. Closed circuit television for projection into seminar rooms.
- b. Dual 16mm sound motion picture projectors.
- c. Slide projectors 3¼ x 4".
- d. Slide projector, 35mm or 2 x 2", w/push button remote control attachment.
- e. Overhead projector (Vu-Graph) for 10" x 10" or smaller transparencies. The overhead projector can be used for "front" projection only. No facilities are available for "rear" projection. For this reason, all overlays are mounted on the front side of vu-graphs.
- f. Motion picture screen.
- g. Green chalkboard.
- h. Easels.
- i. Pointers.
- j. Tape recorder (3.75' or 7.50'/min).
- k. Maps on sliding panels. Panel maps include: a World Mercator Projection (1973); a World Polar Stereographic (1973); and an American Globular Projection (1973).
- l. Slides of all world areas (3" x 4"), except Antarctica, Greenland, the United States, and the northeastern part of the USSR.

## OPERATOR

Trained operators are on duty in the lecture room during normal duty hours to assist as needed during lecture presentations. Special time for rehearsals or to try slides, etc., can be arranged.



*Control Booth*

## VISUAL AIDS


Requests for visual aids should be directed to the College's Audio-Visual Section. This Section can arrange to provide guest lecturers with slides and transparencies in a minimum of 15 working days. (If only lettering is desired, 10 working days.) Clear, typewritten copy is highly desirable, and lettering should be limited to 16 lines per slide or transparency.


Lecturers who wish to use their own visual aids should, as nearly as possible, conform to the standards for production of slides and transparencies shown in the Visual Aids Brochure that is mailed to all guest speakers. This will insure an optimum degree of compatibility with Air War College equipment.

## STUDENT ACTIVITIES

### STUDENT CENTER



The old auditorium is being re-configured for use as a student center. This center will house the mail room, textbook issue and the student bulletin boards. In the same complex, offices will be provided for the class president, class officers, and the year-book committee. A student lounge will also be placed in old auditorium opposite the mail room and offer study areas, leisure reading, and a small auditorium for special seminar projects or presentations.






## ATHLETICS

Many varied athletic facilities at Maxwell AF Base offer a respite from the demanding academic schedule of the Air War College. A well-equipped gymnasium is available to those interested in handball, paddleball, squash, basketball, volleyball, weight lifting, badminton, and a steam bath. Other athletic activities include tennis, golf, bowling, swimming, and jogging.





## SOCIAL FUNCTIONS



MUTUAL understanding and lasting friendships are important benefits fostered by Air War College social activities. Seminar get-togethers, as well as functions involving the entire class, help promote a group spirit necessary to achievement of the College's objectives. Scheduled events include a Fall Formal, Christmas Dance, and Graduation Ball.




*ANG Wives Host Luncheon*



*Fall Banquet Receiving Line*

## WIVES ACTIVITIES



A WIDE variety of activities is available to wives of Air War College students. In addition to their own monthly luncheons and special functions, they may participate in bowling, golf, bridge, ceramics, slimnastics, interior decorating, current events and great books discussions, sewing classes, and many other activities sponsored by the Maxwell Officers' Wives Club.



## SERVICES

